Abstract. Delegation is one important aspect of large-scale distributed systems where many processes and operations run on behalf of system users and clients in order to achieve highly computational and resource intensive tasks. As such, delegation is often synonymous with the concept of trust, in that the delegator would expect some degree of reliability regarding the delegatee's ability and predictability to perform the delegated task. The delegation protocol itself is expected to maintain certain basic properties, such as integrity, traceability, accountability and the ability to determine delegation chains. In this paper, we give an overview of the vulnerabilities that one such delegation protocol exhibits, namely DToken, a lightweight protocol for Grid systems, as interesting examples of design mistakes. We also propose an alternative protocol, DToken II, which fixes such vulnerabilities.
Introduction
Delegation is a concept that is usually mentioned in the context of trust, where generally a delegator would hold some trust in the ability and predictability of the delegatee in carrying out some task on behalf of the delegator or performing some behaviour related to the purpose of the delegation. There have been numerous definitions of what delegation is in the context of computing systems (e.g. [1, 2, 5, 18] ). In Grid systems, a common mechanism used to achieve delegation is via proxy certificates [20] . However, proxy certificates have often been criticised in the past [20] [21] [22] for their weak performance, the lack of symmetric non-repudiation (only the identity of the delegator is preserved in the delegation) and the various security implications arising from the fresh generation of encryption key pairs at each delegation level.
Hence, DToken was proposed as a lightweight protocol [22] that could replace proxy certificates as a reliable and secure solution for the problem of delegation in large-scale Grid systems. Grid middleware systems, such as Globus 1 or GLite 2 , adopt a model of the Grid often referred to as Virtual Organisations 1 www.globus.org 2 glite.web.cern.ch (VOs), where in a VO, users from one organisation are permitted access and usage of resources such as computational power, storage and network bandwidth, belonging to another organisation under certain constraints. However, such cross-organisational provisioning of resources requires critical issues of trust and security to be managed in a reliable manner. One such issue is related to delegations by users to Grid gateways that allow the gateways to perform tasks on behalf of the users within the scope of the delegated permissions. DToken was designed to achieve such delegations in an integrity-preserving, accountable, traceable and determinisitic manner.
In this paper, we provide an overview of the results of a formal analysis that applied to the DToken protocol in [4] and that uncovered serious vulnerabilities in the protocol related to the above properties. We furthermore propose a second corrected version of the protocol, DToken II, which we claim fixes the vulnerabilities of the original version by changing slightly the specification of the protocol to allow agreement on the session identity number between the delegator and the delegatee, prevent the immature passing of permissions from the delegator to the delegatee and finally, use ordered lists instead of sets to pass information about delegation chains.
In the rest of the paper, we give an overview of the DToken protocol in the next Section 2 and discuss three essential properties that we expect to hold of this protocol, namely integrity, traceability and accountability, and deterministic delegation chains. In Section 3, we demonstrate that the protocol in fact suffers from vulnerabilities that undermine all of these desirable properties. In Section 4, we propose a new version of the protocol, DToken II, which implements fixes to the vulnerabilities in the original version. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss related work and conclude in Section 6.
The Delegation Protocol
We give an overview here of the DToken delegation protocol as was defined in [22] . The protocol comprises secure communications between a Delegator, Dor, and a Delegatee, Dee. The following sequence of messages describes the interactions in the protocol:
Sig Dee→Dor , C DorCAs where, C Dor : Long-term public key identity certificate of Dor, C Dee : Long-term public key identity certificate of Dee, V fr : The starting validity date of the delegation, V to : The expiry date of the delegation, T S: A timestamp representing the time the message is generated,
